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The Aftermath of Louis Vuitton:
Why Bringing a Trademark Infringement Case in
the ITC is a Viable Option
By Jake Webb *
ABSTRACT
In 2012, the International Trade Commission (“ITC”) issued a general exclusion
order in favor of Louis Vuitton, prohibiting the importation of any good infringing upon
Louis Vuitton’s famous trademarks. This exclusion order applies to any entity importing
infringing goods, regardless of their status as a party in the ITC investigation. This type
of equitable relief is extremely powerful, and would be preferable over monetary relief to
trademark owners in many scenarios. This was one of the first large-scale trademark
investigations heard by the ITC, and should lead to a drastic increase in the number of
trademark owners who consider the ITC as a viable option for dispute resolution.
The ITC has many potential advantages over District Courts, and this Article
discusses what potential advantages it may offer a trademark owner looking to protect
their mark against infringement. Given its quick resolution, at an average of 15 months,
the ITC is nearly always a much quicker avenue to resolution than District Court.
Further, The ITC’s power to issue equitable relief rather monetary relief gives
trademark owners a choice about which type of remedy would be preferable in their
situation. Given the differences in how disputes will be handled by District Courts and
the ITC, trademark owners should consider their unique situations and determine
whether the ITC may be their preferred alternative to bringing a suit in a District Court.
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INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

¶3

The United States Tariff Act of 1930 (hereinafter “the Act”), 19 U.S.C. § 1337,
prohibits unfair acts and unfair methods of competition involving the importation or sale
of infringing goods in the United States. 1 The Act specifically prohibits the import of patent
infringing or trademark infringing products and allows the rights holder to bring
investigations under the International Trade Commission (“ITC”), an independent judicial
Federal agency. 2 The majority of ITC investigations to date have involved alleged patent
infringement, and there are limited examples of the ITC hearing and ruling on the import
of trademark infringing products. 3 However, in a landmark case in 2012 involving Louis
Vuitton, the ITC granted a general exclusion order against counterfeit Louis Vuitton
products. 4 This case was one of the first ITC trademark cases dealing with such a large
company.
This comment will discuss why the ITC is a better alternative than U.S. district courts
for parties looking to quickly resolve disputes and hoping for injunctive relief more
powerful than that available from district courts.
This comment will first explain in Part 2 the basis for the ITC’s authority and the
process of initiating an ITC investigation. Next, it will explain the process of initiating an
ITC investigation. Included in this section will be recent changes to the statute regarding
the initiation of an investigation, what practical changes this will entail, and why those
changes should not dissuade potential parties from filing in the ITC. Then, in Part 3, this
comment will discuss trademark infringement cases in the ITC, with particular emphasis
on the Louis Vuitton case and the standards that have been applied in trademark
infringement cases, as well as the deviations within the proceedings regarding the applied
standards and tests. This comment will attempt to discern what issues parties need to be
aware of when thinking of filing within the ITC and how they prepare their cases going
forward. It will then discuss in Part 4 the differences between ITC investigations and
district courts cases, the differences in procedure and scope, as well as the differences in
forms of relief offered. While discussing this, it will address the benefits and disadvantages
of each option, and in which scenarios filing in the ITC will be the better option. Finally,
in Part 5, this paper will discuss certain issues the ITC will face going forward, particularly
with respect to trademark infringement cases.
I. THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION AND HOW TO INITIATE INVESTIGATIONS

¶4

The ITC is an “independent, quasijudicial Federal agency with broad investigative
responsibilities on matters of trade.” 5 Section 335 of the Act (19 U.S.C. § 1335) specifically
1

19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2013).
Id.; About the USITC. USITC.COM, http://www.usitc.gov/press_room/about_usitc.htm (last visited
Sept. 8, 2015).
3
Advantages of a Section 337 Investigation at the US International Trade Commission, IP LITIGATOR,
May/June 2006, at 32, 33, http://www.adduci.com/sites/default/files/Sec337Advantages.pdf.
4
Trademarks: Louis Vuitton Case Could Lead to Rush at the ITC. MANAGINGIP.COM,
http://www.managingip.com/Article/3038415/Trade-marks-Louis-Vuitton-case-could-lead-to-rush-at-theITC.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2015).
2

5

About the USITC. USITC.COM, http://www.usitc.gov/press_room/about_usitc.htm (last visited Sept. 8,
2015).
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authorizes the ITC to adopt such reasonable procedures and rules and regulations to carry
out its functions and duties. 6 One of the powers granted to the ITC is to adjudicate cases
dealing with allegations of intellectual property rights infringement. 7 Specifically, the ITC
states in its mission that one of its duties is to “administer U.S. trade remedy laws within
its mandate in a fair and objective manner.” 8 In furthering this mission, the ITC has the
power to deal with the import of allegedly infringing trademarks or patents. 9
An ITC investigation begins when a party files a detailed and fact-based complaint
at the ITC. 10 The complaint is then directed to staff attorneys at the Office of Unfair Import
Investigations, who check the complaint to make sure it follows procedural rules. 11 The
Commission votes whether to institute an investigation within 30 days of the complaint
filing, but if the complaint follows procedural rules, the Commission generally grants an
investigation. 12 If an investigation is granted, it is then assigned to an Administrative Law
Judge who will preside over the investigation. 13 Additionally, the ITC is different from
district courts in that a Staff Attorney is assigned to the case from the Office of Unfair
Import Investigations of the Commission. 14 The Staff Attorney represents the public
interest in the investigation, fully participates in the proceedings, and ensures that all issues
are explored and the factual and legal record is fully complete. 15 The Staff Attorney can
initiate discovery, file briefs, respond to motions, examine witnesses, and participate in the
hearing. 16 Although the Staff Attorney remains neutral for the majority of the hearing, he
or she must declare his or her position to the Administrative Law Judge shortly before a
hearing on the merits begins. 17
Changes relevant to initiating an ITC investigation went into effect on May 20,
2013. 18 While these changes do slightly alter the requirements for a complaint, they should
not practically affect the requirements for initiating a proceeding under the ITC. Therefore,
they should not dissuade any parties considering filing. The first relevant change is
6

19 U.S.C. § 1335 (2013).
About the USITC. USITC.COM, http://www.usitc.gov/press_room/about_usitc.htm (last visited Sept. 8,
2015).
8
Id.
9
19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2013). The statute first states “that the following are unlawful, and when found by
the Commission to exist shall be dealt with.” The statute then states as unlawful, “the importation into the
United States, the sale for importation, or the sale within the United States after importation by the owner,
importer, or consignee, of articles that infringe a valid and enforceable United States patent.” Continuing,
the statute further states as unlawful, “the importation into the United States, the sale for importation, or the
sale within the United States after importation by the owner, importer, or consignee, of articles that infringe
a valid and enforceable United States trademark registered under the Trademark Act of 1946.”
10
Section 337 Frequently Asked Questions, STEPTOE & JOHNSON, http://www.steptoe.com/resourcesdetail-6611.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2015).
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Robert Fischer and Aleksandra Fayer, The Differences Between ITC Investigations and U.S. Court
Lawsuits: What You Need to Know, FITZPATRICK, CELLA, HARPER & SCINTO,
http://www.fitzpatrickcella.com/DB6EDC/assets/files/News/fischer%20fayer%20chinese%20article.pdf
(last visited Sept. 8, 2015).
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Changes in the Rules for ITC Section 337 Investigations Are Now In Effect, MBHB.COM,
http://www.mbhb.com/snippets/alert052013/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2015); See 19 C.F.R. §§ 210.12 (2014).
7
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requiring the complainant to plead more specifically with facts that a domestic industry
either exists or that there is a significant likelihood of an industry’s establishment in the
future. 19 This domestic industry requirement is a unique aspect to ITC investigations since
the only thing necessary to sue in district courts is ownership of a patent or trademark. 20
Specifically, the statute now explicitly states that the complaint must “include a detailed
description of the relevant domestic industry as defined in 337(a)(3).” 21 This will affect
parties alleging that a future industry will develop, but should not practically affect the
complaints of parties whose industry is easily established. 22
A second recent change has been the addition of a requirement for the complaint to
“[c]ontain a clear statement in plain English of the category of products accused.” 23 The
Commission provided a specific example of an acceptable statement in plain English,
stating, “the caption of the investigation might refer to ‘certain electronic devices,’ but the
complaint would provide a further statement to identify the type of products involved in
plain English such as mobile devices, tablets, or computers.” 24 The purpose of this
requirement is to clarify the specific accused products. While this will make the products
in question much easier to understand, the Commission has specifically stated the statement
will not narrow the scope of the Notice of Investigation. 25 This is important to note in the
complaint stage before discovery, but these new rules should not practically affect the
requirements to be heard before the ITC. 26
After the Administrative Law Judge makes a final determination, the parties may
appeal the determination by filing a petition for review. 27 The Commission will review this
petition, and may then grant or deny this petition, either in whole or in part, or may choose
to review the initial determination independently. 28 If the Commission finds a violation of
Section 337, it forwards this determination to the ITC president. 29 The president then has
60 days to deny the determination if it is against policy grounds. 30 If the president decides

19

Id.
Changes in the Rules for ITC Section 337 Investigations Are Now In Effect, MBHB.COM,
http://www.mbhb.com/snippets/alert052013/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2015).
21
19 C.F.R. §§ 210.12 (2014).
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Changes in the Rules for ITC Section 337 Investigations Are Now In Effect, MBHB.COM,
http://www.mbhb.com/snippets/alert052013/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2015), citing 78 Fed. Reg. 23474, 23476
(April 19, 2013).
26
Id.
27
Section 337 Frequently Asked Questions, STEPTOE & JOHNSON, http://www.steptoe.com/resourcesdetail-6611.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2015).
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.; This has only happened three times. Spansion Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 629 F.3d 1331, 1360
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing Certain Fluidized Supporting Apparatus and Components, Inv. No. 337-TA182/188, Comm'n Op. (October 1984) (denying exclusion order because domestic producer could not meet
the demand for hospital burn beds within a reasonable time and there were no alternative sources of
supply); Inclined Field Acceleration Tubes and Components, Inv. No. 337-TA-67, Comm'n Op. (December
1980) (overriding public interest in basic atomic research justified denying relief against imported
acceleration tubes where domestic products were of lower quality than the imports); Certain Automatic
Crankpin Grinders, Inv. No. 337-TA- 60, Comm'n Op. (December 1979) (exclusion order denied on public
interest grounds because of overriding national policy in maintaining and increasing supply of fuel-efficient
automobiles where the domestic industry alone was unable to meet that demand).
20
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not to deny the initial determination, it will become final and go into effect. 31 Parties may
still appeal this final determination within 60 days of the final determination, at which point
the matter will go to the US Court of Appeals of the Federal Circuit. 32
II. TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT IN ITC
¶9

While the ITC and Section 337 specifically address trademark protection, the
majority of cases brought in front of the ITC alleging Section 337 violation deal with patent
infringement. 33 Of the ITC’s intellectual property cases dealing with Section 337
violations, ninety percent involve patent infringement disputes, most of which involve
complex technology. 34 Due to this much more limited history of trademark infringement
disputes, it is not always easy to predict the outcome of trademark disputes in the ITC. This
can make it very difficult to predict how future cases will unfold. Later, this comment will
discuss one important example of this issue where the ITC has applied different
presumption standards for laches, acquiescence, and equitable estoppel. 35
A. Louis Vuitton Case (“In the Matter of Certain Handbags, Luggage, Accessories and
Packaging Thereof”)

¶10

In December of 2010, Louis Vuitton, a French retailer of handbags, luggage, and
accessories, filed a complaint in the ITC alleging the import of trademark-infringing
products in the United States. 36 Louis Vuitton named numerous respondents in the original
complaint. 37 During an initial determination, the administrative law judge found that the
requirements for the complaint, including the domestic industry requirement, had been
met. 38 With this initial determination and completion of discovery, Louis Vuitton moved
for summary judgment and a general exclusion order, a type of remedy issued by the ITC
that prohibits all importation of infringing objects. 39
¶11
In the ruling, the administrative law judge reviewed the requirements for trademark
infringement in the ITC. 40 Citing an earlier Louis Vuitton case from a district court opinion,
the administrative law judge stated that trademark infringement will be reviewed under a
two prong test: whether the “mark merits protection, and whether [the Respondents’] use
of a similar mark is likely to cause customer confusion.” 41 In this case, the ITC looked at

31

Section 337 Frequently Asked Questions, STEPTOE & JOHNSON, http://www.steptoe.com/resourcesdetail-6611.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2015).
32
Id.
33
Litigation – ITC Section 337 Patent Litigation, FINNEGAN.COM,
http://www.finnegan.com/ITCSection337PatentLitigationPractice/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2015).
34
Id.
35
Infra 3.C.
36
In the Matter of Certain Handbags, Luggage, Accessories and Packaging Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA754 at *1, (U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n March 5, 2012) (initial determination granting complainants’ motion
for summary determination of violation and recommended determination on remedy and bonding).
37
Id.
38
Id. at *2.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id. at *3 (citing Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 454 F.3d 108, 115 (2d. Cir.
2006)).
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the Lanham Act to determine evidence of validity. 42 Under the Lanham Act, if the party
owns a federally registered trademark, it “becomes conclusive evidence of validity,
ownership, and exclusive right to use if (1) a registered mark is used continuously for five
years after registration; (2) there has been no final decision adverse to the registrant's claim
of ownership; and (3) an affidavit of incontestability is submitted to the Patent and
Trademark Office.” 43 Since Louis Vuitton had seven federally registered trademarks and
each had been on the Principal Register for more than five years, validity was assumed. 44
¶12
Having determined the validity of the trademark, the administrative law judge then
looked at likelihood of confusion. First, the judge said that analysis of the likelihood of
confusion between authentic and counterfeit marks is unnecessary. 45 Having determined
that one of the respondents was selling counterfeit items, the judge concluded that the
respondent had committed trademark infringement. 46
¶13
Likelihood of confusion for products that are not counterfeit requires a different test.
The test for trademark infringement in this case was whether the accused mark is “likely
to cause confusion or to cause mistake or to deceive.” 47 The administrative law judge then
stated that in determining whether a reasonable consumer is likely to be confused, the
Commission applies a four-factor analysis:
(1) the degree and similarity between the designation and the trademark or
trade name in: appearance, pronunciation of words used, verbal translation
of the pictures or designs involved, and suggestion; (2) the intent of the actor
in adopting the designation; (3) the relation in use and manner of marketing
between the goods and services marketed by the actor and those by the
other; and (4) degree of care likely to be exercised by purchasers. 48
¶14

However, the Commission noted that this analysis is nonexhaustive, and that no
factor is probative. 49 Furthermore, other ITC cases have applied different likelihood of
confusion tests. 50 While district courts apply different factors for likelihood of confusion,
42

Id. at *4.
Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1065; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b).
44
In the Matter of Certain Handbags, Luggage, Accessories and Packaging Thereof, supra note 34, at
*4.
45
Id.; see also Chanel, Inc. v. Gardner, 2011 WL 204911, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2011); see also
Gucci Am., Inc. v. Duty Free Apparel, Ltd., 286 F. Supp. 2d 284, 287 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) “Indeed, confusing
the customer is the whole purpose of creating counterfeit goods”.
46
In the Matter of Certain Handbags, Luggage, Accessories and Packaging Thereof, supra note 34, at
*4.
47
Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1); see also In the Matter of Certain Digital Multimeters and Prods,
with Multimeter Functionality, Inv. No. 337-TA-588 at *5, (U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n Jan. 14, 2008) (initial
determination granting fluke corporation’s motion for summary determination of violation and terminating
the investigation).
48
In the Matter of Certain Handbags, Luggage, Accessories and Packaging Thereof, supra note 34, at
*5; see also Restatement of Torts § 729 (1938); see also In the Matter of Certain Digital Multimeters and
Prods, with Multimeter Functionality, supra note 43, at *6.
49
In the Matter of Certain Handbags, Luggage, Accessories and Packaging Thereof, supra note 34, at
*5.
50
In the Matter of Certain Purple Protective Gloves, Inv. No. 337-TA-500 at *7, (U.S. Int’l Trade
Comm’n September 23, 3004) (initial determination granting motion of complainants Kimberly-Clark
Corp. and Safeskin Corp. for summary determination with respect to domestic industry and violation of
section 337 and recommended determination on remedy and bonding).
43
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they are generally highly overlapping. 51 While the same can be said for the difference in
ITC factors, it does make it difficult for parties to prepare a case or defend a case when
they are unsure of the test that will be applied.
¶15
In applying the factors, the Commission noted the critical question is often the
similarity of the marks. 52 Additionally, it is not individual similarities, but the overall
commercial impression of the two marks that should be compared. 53 The intent factor is
whether alleged infringer attempted to confuse consumers in order to reap benefits from
the reputation of the trademark owner. 54 If there is intent, it is very strong evidence of
confusion. 55 However, a lack of intent is largely irrelevant. 56 The judge declined to make
a finding regarding the third factor offered by the Commission, stating that since the
confusion in this case was post-purchase, it differs from the normal application of this
factor, and therefore, the use of marketing and relation of the products is inapplicable.57
While the Commission found little evidence of actual confusion in this case, it
acknowledged that actual confusion is a strong indicator for likelihood of confusion, but it
is not required for trademark infringement in the ITC. 58 Finally the Commission
acknowledged the strength of Louis Vuitton’s mark and concluded that the company was
afforded wider latitude of protection. 59 Having looked at all of the factors, the Commission
determined Louis Vuitton was entitled to summary determination of trademark
infringement. 60
B. Additional Proof Requirements in ITC Cases
¶16

While the factors applied in this case are not necessarily the factors that will be
applied in future trademark infringement claims in the ITC, they are indicative of the type
of issues that the Commission will contemplate. Similar to district courts, a showing of
actual confusion is “undoubtedly the best evidence of likelihood of confusion.” 61
Additionally, while different factors have been applied for similarity of marks in different
ITC cases, the “overall impression” test is likely to be at the center of each factored
analysis. When thinking about pursuing a claim in the ITC, parties should look to see if
they can establish actual confusion, or in the alternative, whether the overall impression of
the marks is very similar.
¶17
One of the requirements unique to ITC section 337 violations is the requirement that
a product be imported. The party claiming a violation must show by “reliable, probative

51
See generally Infringement and Likelihood of Confusion, NATIONAL PARALEGAL COLLEGE,
http://nationalparalegal.edu/public_documents/courseware_asp_files/patents/Trademarks2/Infringement.as
p (last visited Sept. 8, 2015).
52
In the Matter of Certain Handbags, Luggage, Accessories and Packaging Thereof, supra note 36, at
*6.
53
Id. (citing Restatement Torts § 729 (1938)).
54
Id. at *7.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id. at *8.
60
Id. at *9.
61
Id. at *7 (citing Daddy's Junky Music Stores, Inc. v. Big Daddy's Family Music Ctr., 109 F.3d 275,
284 (6th Cir. 1997)).
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and substantial evidence” the respondents imported or sold after importing the accused
products. 62 However, the evidence required seems fairly limited. Evidence of importation
of a single accused product will satisfy the importation element. 63 Simply providing
evidence that the product was manufactured in another country is sufficient to establish
importation. 64 Both photographic evidence and declarations of the manufactured location
have been found to be sufficient. 65 This appears to be an easy requirement for parties to
satisfy, especially in cases where the import of the product is known to testifying
individuals or easily determinable.
¶18
Finally, section 337 requires that “an industry in the United States, relating to the
articles protected by the ... trademark ... concerned, exists or is in the process of being
established.” 66 An industry is considered to exist if “with respect to the articles protected
by the patent, copyright, trademark, mask work, or design concerned: (A) significant
investment in plant and equipment; (B) significant employment of labor or capital; or (C)
substantial investment in its exploitation, including engineering, research and
development, or licensing.” 67 Showing the existence of any of the three prongs satisfies the
domestic industry requirement. 68 Additionally, the domestic industry requirement is
measured at the time of the filing of the complaint. 69 While this is a fact specific inquiry
and no specific test or amount is required or probative, these requirements appear to be met
fairly easily. Any large company that has invested in its trademark has almost certainly met
the necessary threshold for establishing the existence of an industry. 70 It is also important
to recognize that the company itself does not have to be a United States company. A foreign
company can receive the same protection as long as they prove the requisite domestic
industry within the United States of the product or mark at issue. 71
¶19
By studying different ITC cases, it is clear that it is difficult to predict how the law
will be applied. However, similar to district courts applying different tests for trademark
infringement, nearly all of the tests are similar enough that arguments can be tailored to fit
the specific test applied by the administrative law judge.
C. Affirmative Defenses
¶20

However, some standards have been applied very differently in separate cases, and
it is nearly impossible to predict how they will be applied in future cases. One of these
issues is affirmative defenses to trademark infringement claims. In a trademark
infringement case under the ITC, the Commission recognizes the affirmative defenses of

62

Id. at *8.
19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(C); see also In the Matter of Certain Purple Protective Gloves, supra note 50,
at *3.
64
See In the Matter of Certain Handbags, Luggage, Accessories and Packaging Thereof, supra note 36,
at *8; see also In the Matter of Certain Purple Protective Gloves, supra note 50, at *3.
65
See In the Matter of Certain Handbags, Luggage, Accessories and Packaging Thereof, supra note 36,
at *8; see also In the Matter of Certain Purple Protective Gloves, supra note 50, at *3.
66
19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(2).
67
19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(3).
68
In the Matter of Certain Purple Protective Gloves, supra note 50, at *4.
69
Id.
70
See Id.
71
Section 337 Frequently Asked Questions, Steptoe & Johnson, supra note 10.
63
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laches, equitable estoppel, and acquiescence. 72 However, whether the presumption of these
affirmative defenses applies is very murky.
¶21
There is some conflicting case law on whether the ITC will apply a presumption of
laches in trademark cases based on the relevant state statute of limitations. In the most
recent case on the issue, the administrative judge explicitly rejected arguments based on
the applicable state statute of limitations.73 The judge then held that the unreasonableness
of the delay in trademark cases is evaluated based on the particular circumstances of the
case and that there is no certain period after which a presumption applies. 74 There is some
case law support, however, applying a presumption in trademark cases based on the
applicable state statute of limitations, where the domicile of the respondent determines the
relevant state statutes. 75
1. Laches
¶22

Laches, otherwise known as “estoppel by laches,” is the “neglect or delay in bringing
suit to remedy an alleged wrong, which taken together with lapse of time and other
circumstances, causes prejudice to the adverse party and operates as an equitable bar.” 76
The affirmative defense of laches requires the respondent to establish: “(1) that the
complainant delayed in bringing suit for an unreasonable and inexcusable length of time
from the time it knew or reasonably should have known of the allegedly infringing activity;
and (2) that the respondent suffered material prejudice attributable to complainant’s delay
in bringing the suit.” 77 The material prejudice required must be shown in the form of either
“a change of economic position or loss of evidence.” 78
¶23
There is some conflicting case law in the ITC about whether there is a presumption
of laches based on the analogous state statute of limitations. In some cases, an
administrative law judge has explicitly chosen to not apply a presumption of
unreasonableness based on state statutes. 79 In so holding, the Court said the
unreasonableness requirement would be evaluated based on the facts and circumstances of
the particular case. 80 While the Commission applies a statutory presumption of
unreasonable delay in patent infringement cases, it explicitly distinguishes between
trademark and patent cases due to differences in the duration of rights. 81
72

See, e.g., Certain Bearing and Packaging Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-469, at 11, 26, Initial
Determination Concerning Violation of Section 337 and Recommended Determination on Issues
Concerning Permanent Relief (April 2003), vacated in part and reversed in part on other grounds by
Certain Bearings And Packaging Thereof, USITC Inv. No. 337-TA-469, Opinion (June 2004).
73
Certain Agricultural Vehicles and Components Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-487, at 66-67, Final Initial
and Recommended Determinations (Jan. 2004), vacated on other grounds by Bourdeau Bros., Inc. v. Int’l
Trade Comm., 444 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
74
Id.
75
See Certain Bearing and Packaging Thereof, supra note 72, at 171.
76
Id. at 24 (citing A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1028-29 (Fed. Cir.
1992)).
77
Certain Agricultural Vehicles and Components Thereof, supra note 73, at 66.
78
Id. at 69 (quoting Aukerman 960 F.2d at 1043).
79
Id. at 67.
80
Id. (citing Aukerman 960 F.2d at 1032 (“The length of time which may be deemed unreasonable has
no fixed boundaries but rather depends on the circumstances”)).
81
Id. (citing Aukerman 960 F.2d at 1040); See also Certain Braiding Machines, Inv. No. 337-TA-130,
Unreviewed Initial Determination at 36 (October 1983) (concluding 15 year delay in bringing trademark
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¶24

Additionally, even if the delay is found to be unreasonable, the respondent must show
the delay has caused them material prejudice, and must demonstrate the requisite “extreme
circumstances and egregious delay” required to warrant complete denial of injunctive
relief. 82
¶25
However, there is some ITC case law implying the presumption will be applied. In
Certain Bearings the administrative judge recognized that Federal courts often use
analogous state statutes of limitations as a baseline for whether a presumption of laches
exists. 83 When the ITC applies a presumption based on the analogous statute of limitations,
it will be based on the laws of the domiciliary state of the respondent. 84
¶26
Whenever laches is established, it will generally bar recovery to pre-filing damages
but not to post-filing damages or injunctive relief. 85 However, there is an exception when
the delay has been so extreme or unreasonable that it was essentially an abandonment of
the right. 86
2. Equitable Estoppel
¶27

The affirmative defense of equitable estoppel requires a respondent to demonstrate:
(1) that the trademark owner has engaged in some misconduct that leads the alleged
infringer to reasonably believe that the trademark owner will not assert a claim; (2) that the
respondent relied on the trademark owner's misconduct; and (3) that the respondent has
been materially prejudiced based on its reliance. 87 The misconduct must “lead[] the alleged
infringer to reasonably infer that the patentee does not intend to enforce its patent against
the alleged infringer.” 88 Additionally, the misconduct “may include specific statements,
action, inaction or silence when there is an obligation to speak,” but if silence or inaction
is the basis for an estoppel defense such “inaction must be combined with other facts
respecting the relationship or contacts between the parties to give rise to the necessary

infringement suit was not unreasonable where respondent’s imports were sporadic for a decade and
complainant only recently detected § 337 injury) (“[T]he Commission has considered the merits of this
issue on a case-by-case basis, bearing in mind that section 337 does not require that the unfair acts be
discovered by a certain time.”).
82
Certain Agricultural Vehicles and Components Thereof, supra note 73, at 67; See also Hot Wax, Inc.
v. Turtle Wax, Inc., 191 F.3d 813, 825 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding material prejudice when plaintiff did not
challenge defendant for ten-to-twenty year period while defendant made investments and developed
products); See also Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co. v. Beautone Specialties, Co. Ltd, 82 F. Supp.
2d 997, 1005 (D. Minn. 2000) (issuing injunctive relief despite unreasonable 12-year delay and significant
economic prejudice due to absence of egregious circumstances and likelihood of consumer confusion
between trademarks).
83
Certain Bearings and Packaging Thereof, supra note 72, at 169. See also Lyons Partnership, L.P. v.
Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 796 (4th Cir. 2001) (“While the Lanham Act itself does not provide
an express period of limitations for filing a trademark infringement claim, courts generally assume that
Congress intended that courts ‘borrow’ a limitations period for a federal action at law from an analogous
state law.”).
84
Id. at 171.
85
Certain Agricultural Vehicles and Components Thereof, supra note 73, at 66 (citing Kellogg Co. v.
Exxon Corp., 209 F.3d 562, 568-69 (6th Cir. 2000)).
86
Id., (citing Hot Wax, 191 F.3d at 824 at n.3 (holding where delay exceeded twenty year and
investments of “significant time and money in product development and advertising” established requisite
“extreme circumstances and egregious delay” to bar equitable injunctive relief)).
87
Certain Agricultural Vehicles and Components Thereof, at 40 (citing Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1040).
88
Id. at 52 (citing Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1042).
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inference that the claim against the defendant is abandoned.” 89 This is generally shown by
notice or the threat of enforcement and then a long delay. 90
¶28
The Commission has held that the reliance and prejudice elements of estoppel are
linked because the prejudice “stems from action taken in purported reliance.” 91 The
respondent has the burden to establish by the preponderance of the evidence that petitioner
misled them to believe it would not enforce its trademark rights. 92 Additionally, reliance
on this misconduct “requires more than a belief that one will not be sued; it requires ‘taking
some action’ in substantial reliance on the [][trademark owner’s] misleading conduct.” 93
Respondent may provide proof of investments to its business as evidence of reliance, but
Respondent must prove it changed its economic position because of a belief that petitioner
approved of its infringing nature. 94
¶29
However, even when these three elements are established, the court must still “take
into consideration any other evidence and facts respecting the equities of the parties in
exercising its discretion and deciding whether to allow the defense of equitable estoppel to
bar the suit.” 95
3. Acquiescence
¶30

Acquiescence is an “equitable defense that denotes active consent by a senior user to
another’s use of the mark.” 96 The respondent must demonstrate that: “(1) the trademark
owner actively represented that it would not assert a claim; (2) that the owner unreasonably
and inexcusably delayed between the active representation and the assertion of the claim;
and (3) that the respondent was materially prejudiced as a result of the delay.” 97
Acquiescence is distinguishable from laches, because “it implies active consent [by the
owner to an infringing use of his mark], while laches implies merely passive consent.”98
Acquiescence requires proof more demanding than a showing of unreasonable delay,
which materially prejudiced the alleged infringer, but rather,

89

Id. at 40 (citing Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1042).
See Jensen v. Western Irrigation and Mfg., Inc., 650 F.2d 165, 169 (9th Cir. 1980) (“If a patentee
threatens an alleged infringer with prompt enforcement of the patent and then does nothing, that action may
be sufficiently misleading to induce the alleged infringer to believe that the objection has been
abandoned”); see also Continental Coatings Corp. v. Metco, Inc., 464 F.2d 1375, 1380 (7th Cir. 1972)
(holding estoppel could be present when an “infringement notice was either withdrawn or followed by such
a long period of inactivity as to justify an inference of abandonment.”).
91
Certain Agricultural Vehicles and Components Thereof, supra note 73, at 40 (citing Certain Sortation
Systems, Parts Thereof, And Products Containing Same, Inv. No. 337-TA-460, Comm’n Op. at 10 (Feb. 3,
2003)).
92
Id. at 56.
93
Id. at 57 (quoting Sortation Systems, Comm’n Op. at 18).
94
Id. at 60 (emphasis in original).
95
Id. at 40 (citing Sortation Systems, Comm’n Op. at 10); see also A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.I. Chaides
Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1044 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (reversing summary judgment of equitable estoppel for
defendant when plaintiff might have delayed bringing suit because the amount in issue was de minimis at
the time, rather than abandoning its claim “for all time regardless of quantum.”).
96
Id., at 71 (quoting SunAmerica Corp. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 77 F.3d 1325, 1334 (11th
Cir. 1996)).
97
Id. (citing SunAmerica 77 F.3d at 1334).
98
Id. (emphasis in original)(citing Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayer-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 462 (4th Cir.
1996)).
90
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[t]o defeat a suit for injunctive relief, a defendant must also prove elements
of estoppel which requires more than a showing of mere silence on the part
of a plaintiff; defendant must show that it had been misled by plaintiff
through actual misrepresentations, affirmative acts of misconduct,
intentional misleading silence, or conduct amounting to virtual
abandonment of the trademark. 99
A finding of laches will prevent complainant from recovering damages for infringement
prior to filing of action, but estoppel prevents complainant from obtaining injunctive
relief. 100 “Mere delay or acquiescence cannot defeat the remedy by injunction in support
of the legal right, unless it has been continued so long, and under such circumstances, as to
defeat the right itself.” 101 Additionally, public policy considerations dictate that estoppel
by acquiescence should not be rigidly applied when the likelihood of confusion is
apparent. 102
¶31
Because of this confusion as to the presumptions of affirmative defenses, parties
struggle to predict whether their claim will succeed. If the presumption applies, it may be
difficult for a mark holder to overcome that presumption. In some cases, these difficulties
in predicting the law’s application undermine the confidence of filing an investigation with
the ITC.
III. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE ITC AND DISTRICT COURTS
¶32

Arguably the largest difference in ITC cases and District Court cases are the types of
relief available to each forum. The ITC provides unique relief that makes it the preferable
adjudication forum for many cases. District Courts can award monetary damages in
addition to injunctions prohibiting manufacture, use, or sale of infringing products. 103 Two
types of monetary damages the District Court may provide are reasonable royalties or lost
profits. 104 Additionally, the court may treble the damages in exceptional cases, usually of
willful infringement.
¶33
While District Courts are able to award injunctive relief, it is difficult to receive. In
order for a District Court to award injunctive relief it usually requires four factors. 105 For
example, in eBay v. MercExchange, the Supreme Court held that in order to receive
99

Id. at 71-72 (quoting Kellogg Co. v. Exxon Corp., 209 F.3d 562, 569-574 (6th Cir. 2000)).
Id. at 72 (citing SCI Systems, Inc. v. Solidstate Controls, Inc., 748 F. Supp. 1257, 1262 (S.D. Ohio
1990)).
101
Id. (quoting Melendez v. Holt, 128 U.S. 514, 523 (1888)); see also Sara Lee Corp., 81 F.3d at 463
(reasoning that trademark owner which had entered into a settlement agree with Defendant to govern future
actions in marketing a particular brand did not knowingly and actively consent to defendant’s infringing
use of the mark to support acquiescence finding); see also Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Du Bois Brewing Co.,
175 F.2d 370, 374 (3d Cir. 1949) (holding limits to the doctrine that delay bar bars injunctive relief, stating
“had there been a lapse of a hundred years of more, we think it highly dubious that any court of equity
would grant injunctive relief against even a fraudulent infringer”).
102
Sara Lee Corp., 81 F.3d at 461 (citing 4 McCarthy § 31.04[1]).
103
Fischer and Fayer, supra note 14.
104
Id.
105
Carl C Charneski and Tiffany W Shimada, Does Louis Vuitton’s Recent Victory at the US
International Trade Commission Mark that Tribunal as a Viable Alternative to District Court?, 40 WORLD
TRADEMARK REVIEW, Dec./Jan. 2013, available at,
http://www.brinksgilson.com/files/article_wtr_charneskishimada_wtr_40.pdf (last visited Feb. 4, 2014).
100
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injunctive relief, the plaintiff must show: “(1) there is irreparable harm, (2) the remedies
available at law (monetary damages) are inadequate, (3) considering the balance of
hardship between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity warranted, and (4) the
public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.” 106 While eBay is a
patent infringement case, there are examples of courts applying the same four factors in
determining whether trademark infringement cases warrant injunctive relief. 107
¶34
However, this four-factor test does not apply in the ITC where plaintiff does not need
to meet these four factors to receive injunctive relief. 108 In contrast, the ITC can only
provide injunctive relief, and therefore that is the default remedy for cases brought in the
ITC rather than monetary damages. 109 While the ITC may be more limited in the type of
damages it can award in infringement cases, the injunctive relief afforded by the ITC is
incredibly powerful. 110 Specifically, the ITC may provide three separate types of injunctive
relief: a limited exclusion order, a general exclusion order, and cease-and-desist orders. 111
¶35
A limited exclusion order excludes only the products named in the investigation.112
A general exclusion order, however, may apply even to parties not involved in the
investigation. 113 A general exclusion order prohibits the importation of any infringing
product, regardless of source. 114 In order to receive a general exclusion order the
complainant must establish a 337 violation by “substantial, reliable, and probative
evidence.” 115 A general exclusion order is difficult to receive and usually requires proof of
widespread infringement involving third parties, or that a limited exclusion order would
not protect the intellectual property owner’s interest. 116 However, when granted, this is a
very powerful form of protection and is broader than the injunctive relief provided by
District Courts. 117 One reason is that the ITC has in rem jurisdiction in these cases and,
therefore, has jurisdiction over the infringing products themselves. This is unlike District
Courts which have in personam jurisdiction over the particular party named in the case
rather than the products. 118 In cases of very harmful or particularly widespread
infringement of imported products, the opportunity for a general exclusion order might be
that the incentive a party needs to file in the ITC. Finally, a cease-and-desist order may bar
respondents from the further purchase or sale of infringing products. 119
106

Id. (citing eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006)).
Id.; see Highmark, Inc. v UPMC Health Plan, Inc., 276 F.3d 160 (3d Cir. 2001); see also Enrique
Bernat F., S.A. v. Guadalajara, Inc., 210 F.3d 439 (5th Cir. 2000).
108
Id.; see Spansion, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 629 F.3d 1331, (Fed. Cir. 2010).
109
Fischer and Fayer, supra note 14.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id
114
Id.
115
In re Certain Handbags, Luggage, Accessories and Packaging Thereof, Inv. No. 337-TA-754, USITC
Order No. 16, 2012 (March 5, 2012) (Initial Determination Granting Complainants’ Motion for Summary
Determination of Violation and Recommended Determination for Remedy and Bonding); see also In re
Certain Energy Drink Prods., Inv. No. 337-TA-678, USITC Order No. 34, 2010 (Mar. 30, 2010) (Initial
Determination Finding Violation, Terminating the Investigation and Further Recommending the Entry of a
General Exclusion Order and a 100% Bond).
116
Fischer and Fayer, supra note 14.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id.
107
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Additionally, the ITC is authorized to impose civil penalties on companies who
violate these orders, including penalties up to $100,000 per day or double the value of the
infringing goods. 120 Another attractive aspect of the ITC is that the U.S. Customs Service
will enforce exclusion orders. 121 Comparatively, injunctive relief in district courts requires
the rights holder to monitor whether the infringers are complying with the injunction
themselves. 122
In addition to granting permanent relief in one of these three forms, the ITC may also
grant temporary exclusions or cease-and-desist orders. 123 However, there is a high standard
of proof for this early decision and therefore they are granted very rarely. 124
While general exclusion orders are the most powerful, they are also the least
frequently given. 125 For example, in 2008 the ITC issued fourteen cease-and-desist orders,
five limited exclusion orders, and only two general exclusion orders. 126 However, in
situations that appear to warrant a general exclusion order, the opportunity for one may
justify filing the claim with the ITC.
In addition to the opportunity for general exclusion order, another advantage of filing
in the ITC is its speed. Congress initially intended ITC investigations to finish within one
year. 127 While this is not a strict limit, most cases are usually completed in less than a year
and a half. 128 Additionally, the Commission is required to set target dates for the
completion of the case at the outset, which helps parties who need a conclusion quickly.129
The majority of the cases take between 12-18 months, and the average case is 15 months.130
By contrast, the median time to trial in patent litigation lawsuits in federal district courts in
2009 was 25 months, and there is greater variety in this number than in ITC proceedings. 131
In situations where parties are being harmed by the continual import of infringing goods,
the speed to resolution of ITC cases is very appealing. Additionally, because of the target
date and interest of the Commission in resolving the case, there are not as many
opportunities to delay trial or increase discovery, as often is the case in district court
cases. 132
However, there is one difference in the ITC and district courts that actually favors
the district courts. Due to the high standard of proof it requires, the ITC rarely awards
temporary injunctive relief, or at least not quickly. Therefore, if a trademark owner wishes
to seek a temporary injunction or temporary restraining order, it is best to file in a district

120

Id. at 8.
Id.
122
Id.
123
Section 337 Frequently Asked Questions, STEPTOE & JOHNSON, http://www.steptoe.com/resourcesdetail-6611.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2015).
124
Id.
125
Fischer & Fayer, supra note 14, at 8.
126
Id.
127
Section 337 Frequently Asked Questions, STEPTOE & JOHNSON, http://www.steptoe.com/resourcesdetail-6611.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2015).
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Fischer & Fayer, supra note 14, at 9.
131
Id. at 7.
132
H. Mark Lyon, and Sarah R. Piepmeier, ITC Section 337 Investigations: Patent Infringement Claims,
GIBSON DUNN 2, http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/LyonITCSection337InvestigationsPatentInfingementClaims.pdf (last visited Sept. 8, 2015).
121
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court. 133 Often it will be prudent for parties to file within the district courts for a preliminary
motion on a temporary injunction and then file an addition claim in the ITC in order to seek
a more broad exclusion. 134
¶41
It is important to note that complainants may file suit in both the ITC and also a
parallel action in a district court. 135 However, respondents in the ITC investigation who are
also defendants in the parallel district court action may choose to stay out of the district
court until the outcome of the Section 337 investigation is complete. 136 At the completion
of the investigation, the record of the ITC investigation may be transmitted to the parallel
action filed in the district court. 137 Obviously this is a beneficial option for plaintiffs
confident in their case because they will be able to receive an exclusion order as quickly as
possible while maintaining the opportunity to pursue damages in the district court after the
final determination of the ITC.
¶42
Another difference between the ITC and district courts is that counterclaims are not
permitted in the ITC. 138 While a respondent in an ITC case may raise a defense, such as
invalidity, or failing to satisfy specificity requirements, these defenses may not be asserted
as counterclaims as they may be in district courts. 139 If the district court dismisses the
infringement claim, these claims may still be heard. 140 Since these counterclaims are not
permitted in the ITC, whenever the infringement claim is dismissed, the case concludes.
However, there is a unique process where an accused infringer may file a counterclaim in
an ITC hearing by transferring the case to a district court. 141 After this, the alleged infringer
may request, and the district court may grant, a stay of the district court case until the ITC
gives its final determination on the 337 hearing. 142 Finally, while the ITC determination is
not binding on district courts, it may be used as evidence and is a strong indicator of which
way the district court will rule. 143
IV. CONCLUSION
¶43

While there are differences between the ITC and district courts, the ITC has shown
that it has certain advantages that should make parties seeking injunctive relief consider it
as their forum of choice over the traditional district court route. Even though the ITC has
been primarily known for hearing patent infringement cases, the Louis Vuitton decision
demonstrated the Commission’s willingness to listen to trademark infringement cases and
grant very powerful remedies in the case of very harmful infringement.
133
See Pelletier, Dean A., Litigating Trademark Cases at ITC vs. District Court, LAW360 (July 17,
2012, 1:27PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/359626/litigating-trademark-cases-at-itc-vs-district-court.
134
Id.
135
Section 337 FAQ, INT’L TRADE COMMISSION TRIAL LAW. ASS’N,
http://www.itctla.org/resources/faqs#role (last visited Sept. 8, 2015).
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Fischer & Fayer, supra note 14, at 7.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Jason R. Strobel, Section 337 Proceedings Before the ITC: Another Weapon Against Patent and
Trademark Infringement, HAHN LOESER & PARKS, http://www.hahnloeser.com/references/716.pdf (last
visited Sept. 8, 2015).
142
Id.
143
See id.
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¶44

While the ITC has certain limitations that district courts do not—specifically, the
inability to grant monetary remedies—it offers a unique forum distinct from district courts
that might be a better option in certain scenarios. For example, if a party is having difficulty
proving monetary damages then filing a complaint in the ITC and searching for injunctive
relief is a more attractive option. The potential expense of filing multiple cases in district
courts against each alleged infringer, combined with the infringing parties’ ability to delay
the case to the extent they are unable to in ITC proceedings, provides the ITC with unique
advantages over district courts. Additionally, if a plaintiff is confident in their case the
option to file parallel cases in both forums is an appealing opportunity. While it is
problematic if the plaintiff does not receive a final determination in their favor in the ITC,
filing parallel claims offers the opportunity to receive an exclusion order as quickly as
possible, while maintaining the chance to receive adequate monetary damages at the
conclusion of the ITC determination.
¶45
Patent infringement cases heard in the ITC have increased throughout the past
decade. 144 Between 1990 and 1999, there were an average of 12.2 infringement cases heard
in the ITC annually. 145 Comparatively, between 2010 and 2013 there were an average of
52 infringement cases heard in the ITC annually. 146 Considering that most of these cases
are patent infringement cases, it can be expected that these numbers will continue to
increase as additional trademark infringement cases are heard.

144
See Number of Section 337 Investigations Instituted by Fiscal Year, USITC.GOV,
http://www.usitc.gov/intellectual_property/documents/fy_337_institutions.pdf (last visited Sept. 8, 2015).
145
See id.
146
See id.
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